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ABSTRACT 
An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an 
individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the 
hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing 
overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at 
work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral 
effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics 
and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through 
rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From 
these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election 
outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. 
Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic 
crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater 
electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more 
accountable to their electorates. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The first studies on economics and elections forged macrolevel links. Different 
macroeconomic indicators sometimes showed themselves determinants of national incumbent 
support, measured in votes or popularity. [See the reviews of Nannestad and Paldam (1994); 
Norpoth (1996); Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).] The inference is that democratic voters 
are economic, rewarding the government for good times, and punishing it for bad. However, 
this inference, reported by itself, remains suspect because of the ecological fallacy (Kramer, 
1983; Robinson, 1950). That is, individual voters may not act this way, in which case 
observed national economy-election patterns are spurious. To counter this possibility, studies 
have moved to the microlevel, examining voters in election surveys. These efforts were 
initially on individual democracies – notably the United States, France, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom. [See, as examples, respectively, Kiewiet (1983); Lewis-Beck (1983); Borre (1997); 
Sanders (2003).] Then, investigations became evermore micro and comparative, stretching 
across larger and larger samples of nations (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1988). 
Over a broad range of democracies, in time and space, survey work supports the economic 
voter hypothesis. [See the current reviews of Duch (2007); Hellwig (2010); Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2007).] With minor caveats, then, the ecological fallacy argument has not been 
sustained. 
However, another classic, the fallacy of composition, has not received the scrutiny it 
deserves (Blackburn, 2008: 69). That fallacy occurs when the truth of the part is not true for 
the whole. An opposite of the ecological fallacy, we label it here the micrological fallacy, a 
usage paralleling the micro/macro distinction in economics (where what makes sense at the 
micro-level may not make sense at the macro-level, as the notorious Paradox of Thrift 
illustrates). Specifically in election studies, while individual voters may appear to be 
economic voters, all voters taken together may not reflect the changing state of the economy. 
Put another way, the collective vote of the national electorate might not respond to national 
economic conditions, despite a seemingly supportive microfoundation. If this micrological 
fallacy holds, then the importance of the economic vote declines greatly. Why? Because it 
would suggest that economic evaluation, as expressed by individual citizens, does not 
ultimately hold the government accountable. A government presiding over bad national 
economic conditions, such as poor growth or rising unemployment, could escape punishment 
at the ballot box. Democracy, then, stands badly served. Using a formidable database of 
European nations, we examine whether national governments, in fact, are punished (or 
rewarded) by votes on the basis of national economic performance. We look at the general 
case, voting in normal times, then at voting in times of crisis. Of special interest is the 
possibility that governments are held still more accountable for the economy during crisis 
periods. 
Below, we look at relevant literature and theory, where we elaborate on the 
possibilites for the micrological fallacy. That discussion leads to the formulation of two 
hypotheses for testing, with regard to the relationship of macroeconomics and electoral 
outcomes, one hypothesis for normal times and another for times of crisis. Then we discuss 
our European data pool and our politico-economic measures, followed by an explication of 
our methodology. Our estimated equations are presented in three parts: static, dynamic, and 
crisis. In conclusion, we reconcile the micrological fallacy, and trace a myriad of 
macroeconomic effects on European electoral outcomes.  
 
LITERATURE AND THEORY 
 The scope of the economic voting literature, now estimated at over 500 articles and 
books, makes its summary difficult (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck, 2012). However, it can be 
simplified by focusing theoretically on the classic economic voting paradigm, and 
substantively on the relevant comparative findings. With respect to theory, the organizing idea 
is retrospective economic voting, wherein the voter judges the economic record of the 
government, rewarding or punishing accordingly at the ballot box (Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966; 
Lewis-Beck, 1988). With respect to comparative findings, we examine essentially European 
studies, first at the microlevel, then at the macrolevel. Reviewing the microlevel 
investigations, where the data are national surveys and the dependent variable is a measure of 
the incumbent vote, they converge on the notion that sociotropic economic evaluations matter 
(Anderson, 2000; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig, 2008; 
Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Nadeau et al., 2013; van der Eijk et al., 2007). When the respondent 
perceives the economy has worsened over the past year, they are significantly more likely to 
declare a vote against the government (coalition).  
 
(…) 
 
The micrological fallacy stands opposite of the ecological fallacy. While both are 
fallacies of inference, the latter makes the mistake of inferring the part from the whole, e.g., 
inferring individual economic voting from aggregate patterns connecting macroeconomic 
indicators and election outcomes. The former, in contrast, makes the mistake of inferring the 
whole from the part, e.g., inferring an aggregate economics-elections connection from 
individual patterns of economic voting. In comparative economic voting research, the door 
stands open to the commitment of a micrological fallacy, given the contradiction between the 
micro-level, individual survey results and the macro-level, aggregate results. That is, strong 
micro-findings co-exist with weak to non-existent macro-findings. Two initial micro-
possibilities might explain this apparent inconsistency First, individual economic perceptions 
of the national economy could be based on error. Second, these economic perceptions could 
be accurate, but not add up to the observed macroeconomic condition.  
 
(…) 
 
The two foregoing individual-level possibilities for inducing a micrological fallacy 
concern the “part” of the “whole.” There is also a third (aggregate-level) possibility, 
concerning just the “whole” - the measurement of the macroeconomy itself. Obviously, if at 
the aggregate-level the economy is improperly, or incompletely, measured in a model 
predicting electoral outcomes, then its effect might not register. As noted, the leading 
measures have been versions of unemployment, inflation, or growth (at different lags). We 
would argue that the growth variable stands least likely to feed the micrological fallacy, 
because of its empirical precision and conceptual breadth. GDP growth, as Norpoth et al. 
(1991: 5) suggested some time ago, allows us to formulate models with an economic indicator 
“as global as possible….to capture the shifting weighting scheme utilized in the political 
economic calculus of the democratic voter.” This measurement strategy receives support, in a 
preliminary way, in the findings of Wilken et al. (1997). Their early cross-sectional 
examination of 38 world elections (from developed and underdeveloped democracies, 1988-
1994) concludes that for “every percentage point of GDP growth in the election year, [the 
incumbent] party stands to gain 1.4 percent of the vote.” (Wilken et al., 1997: 307). Further, 
more recent economic voting work, by Singer (2011a) and Van der Brug et al. (2007), 
explicitly supports the use of GDP growth, over inflation and unemployment measures, on 
grounds that it yields the largest effect. 
These foregoing considerations lead us to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Positive (negative) GDP growth yields increases (decreases) in incumbent vote 
support. 
We expect H1 to be supported as a general proposition, when tested against our 
macro-data-set on European electorates. Such support would be all to the good for, as Paldam 
(1991: 11) observes: “it is highly desirable if models are general and institution free, so that 
the same basic model works across countries and over time.” After all, the model being tested 
derives itself from the pure theory of the economic vote. However, as subsequent research has 
shown, the economic vote, even if a pure force, can be conditioned by institutions and events 
(Nadeau et al., 2002; Powell and Whitten, 1993). Therefore, we do explore further tests, 
especially on the clarity of responsibility idea, as shall be seen below. 
 
(…) 
 
 More specifically, in times of economic recession, the economy would have more 
salience to voters. For one, that information on the economy is more easily accessible in times 
of crisis, according to the work of (Singer, 2011a). Further, Singer (2011b) shows that during 
an economic recession more citizens perceive the impact of the economy on their personal 
situation. These findings accord with the earlier European results from Nannestad and Paldam 
(1997), who showed the presence of a grievance asymmetry at the individual level. Danish 
voters’ evaluations of the economy were stronger predictors of support for government parties 
when voters perceived a worsening economy, as opposed to an improving economy. 
However, not all micro-studies support such a result. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013), in 
their current review of the problem, conclude that overall micro-level evidence on the 
asymmetry hypothesis is “mixed.” With regard specifically to its presence in times of 
economic crisis, the debate still continues [for a review there, see Singer, 2011a]. Given the 
different theoretical arguments (and scattered empirical evidence) for an asymmetric 
economic vote induced by the condition of crisis itself, we tentatively offer our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: During economic crisis, GDP growth relates more strongly to incumbent vote 
support. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
The dataset covers 359 elections in 31 European countries. While countries outside of 
Europe are not covered, the focus on this region allows near-exhaustive coverage in a large 
and balanced national time series pool, from 1950 onwards. Furthermore, recent financial and 
economic crises warrant a focus on the European context. Several European countries have 
suffered severely in the post-2008 period, in a pattern of crisis referred to as a “domino 
effect”, because of the interdependence of these economies within the European Union 
(Bellucci et al., 2012: 469). While the crisis has had an especially profound impact in the 
European periphery (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012), overall considerable variation exists in 
the lived experiences of these European economics (LeDuc and Pammett, 2013). Even though 
European countries share similarities, their substantial differences remain. This combination 
of unity and diversity, then, makes Europe an ideal context to test theories of economic voting 
(LeDuc and Pammet, 2013). 
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We include the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those of Western 
Europe, repeatedly and regularly measured over time. For almost all Western European 
countries the time series starts in 1950. For Central and Eastern European countries, the data 
usually begin around the mid-nineties (when they devised functioning competitive elections). 
These time frames then, correspond to the periods in which democracy was clearly 
established, a prerequisite for testing our hypotheses. (With respect to Germany, before 
unification only West Germany is included, but from 1989 onwards the unified country is 
included. Both are treated as separate countries in the analyses). The full set of countries (31), 
and elections (359), is quite heterogeneous, as can be observed in the listing of Table 2. 
 TABLE 2. Cases included in the analyses 
Country # % Period 
Austria 18 5.01 1953-2008 
Belgium 18 5.01 1954-2010 
Britain 15 4.18 1955-2010 
Bulgaria 5 1.39 1994-2009 
Cyprus 7 1.95 1981-2011 
Czech Republic 5 1.39 1996-2010 
Denmark 23 6.41 1953-2011 
Estonia 5 1.39 1995-2011 
Finland 16 4.46 1954-2011 
France 15 4.18 1956-2012 
Germany 5 1.39 1994-2009 
Greece 14 3.90 1977-2012 
Hungary 5 1.39 1994-2010 
Iceland 19 5.29 1953-2013 
Ireland 17 4.74 1953-2011 
Italy 16 4.46 1953-2013 
Latvia 5 1.39 1995-2011 
Lithuania 5 1.39 1996-2012 
Luxembourg 12 3.34 1954-2009 
Malta 10 2.79 1966-2008 
Netherlands 19 5.29 1952-2012 
Norway 15 4.18 1953-2009 
Poland 6 1.67 1993-2011 
Portugal 11 3.06 1980-2011 
Romania 6 1.67 1992-2012 
Slovak Republic 6 1.67 1994-2012 
Slovenia 6 1.67 1992-2011 
Spain 10 2.79 1979-2011 
Sweden 19 5.29 1952-2010 
Switzerland 15 4.18 1955-2011 
West Germany 11 3.06 1953-1990 
Total 359 100.00 1952-2013 
 
METHODS 
The data compose a time-series-cross-section (TSCS), a structure to be taken into 
account when modeling. Therefore, different approaches were considered. As a baseline, we 
estimated static models on the effects of different variables on incumbent vote share (without 
controlling for the previous electoral score of the incumbents). Different modeling strategies 
were investigated. First, a naïve pooled ordinary least squares model was examined, its 
standard errors corrected for the country-clusters. Second, a fixed effects (FE) model was 
developed, in which the country-level effects were simply controlled for by means of country-
dummies (Allison, 2009). Third, a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) model was 
applied, enabling us to fit an estimator that controls for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Fourth, because in general the estimates of a GLS estimation are less efficient, a random 
coefficient model was estimated by means of a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure as well 
(Hox, 2010). After static models were explored, dynamic models were developed, with a 
control on the effect of the electoral result of incumbent parties in the previous election (as a 
lagged dependent variable – LDV). As with the static models, four approaches were 
investigated; an OLS pooled model, a fixed effects model, a random effects GLS model and a 
random effects ML model.  
 
(…) 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
The analyses presented in Table 3 are encouraging. First, regardless of whether we 
consider a static or a dynamic model, the fit statistics are strong according to the R2-values. 
With respect to the independent variable effect, we begin the discussion with Model 1. 
Looking at the control variables, two attain statistical significance. These results suggest that 
as the number of parties in government increases, the incumbent vote share increases. 
Furthermore, the incumbent vote share will tend to be smaller, when the system in general has 
a larger number of parties. Finally, whether a caretaker government was in office before the 
election does not significantly affect the incumbent vote share. These structural results are 
comforting, if unsurprising. What about our main variable of interest, GDP? We observe that 
it appears to have a statistically significant and substantively important effect. Specifically, a 
one percentage increase in GDP growth yields about a 0.7 percentage point increase in 
incumbent support. This is a rather large effect, falling as it does not far from unit elasticity 
(with its 1:1 percentage ratio).  
 
TABLE 3. Effect of the economy on incumbent vote shares 
 Model 1: Static 
FE PCSE 
Model 2: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
Incumbent vote share (e-1)  0.844*** 
(0.043) 
GDP growth 0.713** 
(0.214) 
0.737*** 
(0.146) 
Caretaker government 3.190 
(2.670) 
2.136 
(1.519) 
ENEP (e-1) -2.614*** 
(0.493) 
0.780 
(0.438) 
Number of parties in 
government 
7.009*** 
(1.013) 
0.347 
(0.576) 
Constant 56.629*** 
(4.937) 
2.730 
(3.318) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Nelections 359 359 
Ncountries 31 31 
R2 0.611 0.809 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Panel corrected standard errors reported.  
 
The Model 1 results do indicate strong economic effects. It could be argued, however, 
that in order to investigate the effect of the economy on electoral success and failure, starting 
points have to be taken into account. More specifically, it may be that current incumbent 
support partly derives from past incumbent support. At the microlevel, that process would 
operate through something like the persistence of partisan identification. At the macrolevel, in 
addition to picking up that pattern, past vote share would tap into independent variables 
omitted from the model specification (including missing variables on political context or 
issues, such as immigration or crime). Thus, it acts as a very strong control, increasing 
predictive power and applying a tough test for the survival of GDP effects. Furthermore, the 
reported presence of serial autocorrelation in Model 1 argues for the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable. In Model 2, therefore, we take Model 1 a step further, including 
incumbent vote share in the previous election as an independent variable. 
 As such, Model 2 incorporates a time component, becoming dynamic and providing 
further insight into the effect of the economy. According to its estimates (see column 2, Table 
3), the effect of the GDP growth rate remains significant, even increasing its level (to p < 
.001). Moreover, its strength persists. Indeed, the size of its coefficient is about equal for both 
modeling approaches (at 0.7). We can say, with more confidence, that the state of the 
economy affects incumbent support on election day. Further, the explanatory power of Model 
2 is considerably higher, with an R2-value indicating that about 80% of the variance in 
incumbent vote share is explained. Last, but not least, we can report that building on this 
specification we tested the possibility of interaction effects relating to the clarity of 
responsibility hypothesis (Powell and Whitten, 1993); no significant results were found there.i 
These null findings are almost certainly due to the powerful controlling effects of the lagged 
incumbent vote share variable on the right-hand side, and its capturing of the influence of 
omitted variables).  
 
CRISIS RESULTS 
Our first hypothesis, on the relationship of GDP growth and incumbent support, 
receives strong confirmation from the findings in Table 3. What about our second hypothesis, 
where we expect the economy to relate more strongly to incumbent electoral success during 
an economic crisis? In order to investigate this possibility different approaches are taken. 
First, we examine whether the link between the economy and incumbent vote share is more 
pronounced after the recent economic and financial crisis, begun in 2008. We investigate this 
by means of a simple crisis-dummy, scored one for elections from 2008 onwards (i.e., 41 out 
of the 359 elections) and zero otherwise. For testing, we explore the impact of this crisis 
dummy by itself, and in interaction with the GDP variable. These estimates appear in Table 4. 
The simple 2008 crisis dummy falls far short of statistical significance in both the static and 
dynamic models (see, respectively, columns 1 and 3). Further, the interaction crisis term falls 
far short of significance in the static model, and only achieves marginal significance in the 
dynamic model. These null, fragile results lead us to the following conclusion: while the 
incumbent governments of Europe may have been punished by the post-2008 economic crisis, 
that punishment has been no greater than for economic downturns occurring in other periods. 
The 2008 economic crisis, then, has not engendered unique effects on incumbent party vote 
shares of the region.  
 The fact that the economic blows falling on elected governments after 2008 are 
not unique does not mean that they were not real blows. But it does mean that another process 
may be going on. Perhaps economic crisis, rather than being temporally specific, works 
whenever the economy takes a serious downturn. In other words, the crisis period need not be, 
in fact should not be, time bound. Thus, we focus on economic downturn in general, by 
modeling spline regressions. Recall that spline regression has value when the research 
question concerns what produces differences in slope (Marsh and Cormier, 2002). 
Operationalizing zero GDP growth as the turning point (and therefore the spline knot), we can 
investigate whether the GDP growth effect is more or less pronounced depending if it is 
positive or negative. Thus, we investigate differences in the size of the effect for negative and 
positive GDP growth rates, respectively. In order to estimate such a spline regression model, 
two variables are created. A first variable, called GDP (-) corresponds to GDP growth rates if 
these are negative, but takes on the value of 0 otherwise. The second variable, called GDP (+) 
has values corresponding to the GDP growth rates when these are positive, but takes on a 
value of 0 otherwise. Doing so we use the natural and straightforward zero threshold for 
investigating asymmetric economic effects first offered by Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). 
Applying this spine regression approach, we can observe any differential effects (see 
columns 2 and 4, Table 4). Are negative GDP growth rates more determining for incumbent 
vote share? The results of the spline regression models in Table 4 confirm this expectation. In 
the static, as well as in the dynamic, models both the effects of positive and of negative GDP 
growth attain significance. Additionally, in the two models, the coefficient for negative 
economic growth is larger than the coefficient for positive economic growth. Clearly, the 
results are robust and straightforward: negative economic growth has more importance for 
incumbent electoral results. While the coefficients differ depending on the specific model, the 
negative spline coefficient approaches twice the magnitude of the positive spline coefficient 
(respectively, .99/.63 and 1.00/.66). These findings suggest that the effect of the economy, 
looked upon from a macro-perspective, almost doubles in times of economic recession, 
compared to times of economic growth. Both coefficients are positive, indicating that as the 
economy is doing better, incumbents obtain a larger share of the votes. For example, moving 
from a -2% to a -1% GDP growth rate has close to twice the effect on incumbent support, 
compared to moving from 1% to 2% GDP growth rate. Clearly, economic crisis, understood 
as the general phenomenon of negative economic growth, intensifies the impact of GDP 
change on incumbent vote, so supporting our second hypothesis.  
 
TABLE 4. Crisis effects 
 Model 1: Static 
FE PCSE 
Model 2: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
 Interaction 
Crisis*GDP 
Splines 
regression 
Interaction 
Crisis*GDP 
Splines 
regression 
Incumbent vote share (e-1)   0.845*** 
(0.041) 
0.844*** 
(0.043) 
GDP growth 0.575* 
(0.244) 
 0.601*** 
(0.143) 
 
Negative GDP growth   0.988* 
(0.474) 
 1.001** 
(0.387) 
Positive GDP growth  0.631* 
(0.267) 
 0.657*** 
(0.146) 
Post-2008 crisis -3.668 
(2.219) 
 -1.951 
(1.576) 
 
Post-2008 crisis*GDP 
growth 
 
0.322 
(0.303) 
 0.675* 
(0.319) 
 
Caretaker government 3.442 
(2.646) 
3.434 
(2.731) 
2.448 
(1.486) 
2.370 
(1.528) 
ENEP (e-1) -2.640*** 
(0.494) 
-2.627*** 
(0.504) 
0.810 
(0.426) 
0.768 
(0.449) 
Number of parties in 
government 
7.132*** 
(1.019) 
7.032*** 
(1.028) 
0.355 
(0.543) 
0.370 
(0.596) 
Constant 57.103*** 
(5.048) 
56.916*** 
(5.036) 
3.001 
(3.316) 
3.010 
(3.394) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nelections 359 359 359 359 
Ncountries 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.615 0.611 0.812 0.810 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Panel corrected standard errors reported.  
 
CHALLENGES 
Thus far, we have found strong support for our two central hypotheses, in terms of the 
functioning of these European democracies. First, in general, economic growth relates to 
incumbent vote support as expected. In particular, negative economic growth generally yields 
decreases in incumbent vote support. Second, the relationship between economic growth and 
incumbent vote support strengthens under economic crisis. In particular, it takes an 
asymmetric form, with negative economic growth having a greater impact than positive 
economic growth. As firm as these findings appear to be, they are not immune from 
challenge. In this section, we consider several relevant challenges, from the measurement of 
the dependent variable of incumbent vote and the independent variable of economic 
performance, to the specification of the non-economic independent variables. Below, we 
consider these in turn, beginning with the measurement questions, and ending with the 
specification questions.  
 
(…) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Economic voting seems undeniable, according to the numerous micro-level, election 
survey studies undertaken around the democratic world. These results refute the charge of an 
ecological fallacy, with respect to the inference that economic perceptions influence vote 
choice. However, economic voting theory has another charge to overcome, that of commiting 
a micrological fallacy. We have argued the plausiblity of the notion that, while individual 
citizens may be economic voters, the entire electorate itself may not act like an economic 
voter. In other words, those individual economic vote choices might not add up to a 
macroeconomic impact on the incumbent government’s vote share. This possibility we base 
not only on logic, but on the weak empirical results from numerous aggregate investigations, 
which have attempted to link macroeconomic fluctuations to overall electoral outcomes.  
Herein, we attempt to show a micrological fallacy has not been committed, by 
demonstrating an unambigous connection between GDP growth and aggregate incumbent 
vote share in European democratic elections. We explore a very large pool of elections (359) 
from many countries (31) over an extended time period (1950-2013). While the countries 
confine themselves to the European continent, they nevertheless represent considerable 
political and economic heterogeneity. Our analyses, and their various challenges, reveal sharp 
and powerful effects. In general, a one percentage point change in economic growth produces 
almost a three-quarter percentage point change in incumbent vote support. This clear 
confirmation of our first hypothesis has merit in its own right. However, it has a double 
importance, by its refutation of the micrological fallacy. That macro-refutation of the 
micrological fallacy, along with the micro-refutation of the ecological fallacy, make for a 
perfect marriage. With unparalleled confidence, we can assert that economic voting is real, 
and really matters. 
This confidence allowed us to pursue our second hypothesis with vigor. Economic 
crisis alters the impact of growth on the vote, rendering it asymmetric. Economic crisis, 
defined as negative GDP growth, can occur anywhere along the time line. And, when these 
bad economic times occur, its electoral impact is magnified, compared to economic good 
times. Specifically, the cost in incumbent votes from an economic bust (e.g., a negative 
growth of – 1%) comes to about double the benefit in incumbent votes received from an 
economic boom (e.g., a positive growth of +1%). Thus, we see that governments are punished 
more for bad economic policy, than they are rewarded for good economic policy. Perhaps that 
is as it should be, for it pushes governments to work harder at reducing mass hardship. 
Further, this asymmetry in reward and punishment suggests that leaders are held especially 
accountable for poor performance. If so, it serves as a useful reminder to elected officials that 
the people are paying attention. 
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